2020 Police Intervention Options Report
The RCMP makes every effort to ensure the data included in this report is complete, accurate and up-to-date. Amendments are made as new information becomes available.
Table of contents
- Preface
- Police intervention
- Incident management/Intervention model
- Subject behaviour/Officer response reporting
- Training
- Police intervention options data and trends analysis
- Oversight and accountability
- Conclusion
- Appendices
- End notes
Key highlights
- 99.9 per cent of all occurrences continue to be resolved without the application of a police intervention option.
- The most common occurrence resulting in the application of a police intervention option was assault on a police officer, at 19 per cent.
- In April 2021, the Incident Management Intervention Model and related training was updated to place more emphasis on communication and de-escalation.
- Across Canada, an average of 69 per cent of occurrences where police intervention options were applied involved a subject perceived to be under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs.
- Across Canada, an average of 51 per cent of occurrences where police intervention options were applied involved a subject perceived or believed to be in possession of a weapon.
- 19.5 per cent of subjects were transported to a hospital or clinic for treatment related to the application of police intervention options.
- A total of 20 officer-involved shootings, 6 non-fatal and 14 fatal, occurred in 2020.
- RCMP officers were shot at 18 times by subjects in 2020, resulting in the injury of three RCMP officers and the death of one RCMP officer. This is the highest rate of RCMP officers being shot at in the past 11 years.
- The RCMP is collaborating with Canadian police chiefs to re-examine our current police intervention and de-escalation framework and move towards a refreshed model developed in consultation with the policing community, the provinces and territories, as well as Indigenous and racialized communities.
Learn more about the RCMP's strategy for modernizing the organization, including:
- the collection and analysis of race-based data to address systemic racism and discrimination
- the implementation of body-worn cameras for RCMP officers
- updates to the RCMP's crisis intervention and de-escalation tools and training
Preface
To promote trust, transparency, and accountability for the Canadian public, the RCMP is committed to open, proactive, and routine disclosure of police intervention option data. Following last year's release of data from 2010-2019, the following data and report capture the use of police intervention options in 2020. This report builds on last year's release of police intervention option data and will now include reporting on a greater number of situational factors (for example, substance use, emotionally disturbed persons End note 1, weapons, gender) and provide provincial/territorial breakdowns. For additional context on the RCMP's provincial breakdown of police officers and occurrences, please see the RCMP Occurrence Report and Statistics Canada's report on Police Resources in Canada.
In any interaction with the public, RCMP officers are guided by the RCMP's Bias-Free Policing policy, which is based on the principles of equality and non-discrimination, as well as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Canadian Human Rights Act, the RCMP Act, and the RCMP's mission, vision, and core values. Bias-free policing means equitable treatment of all persons by all RCMP employees in the performance of their duties, in accordance with the law and without abusing their authority regardless of an individual's race, national or ethnic origin, skin colour, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, marital status, family status, citizenship, socio-economic status, genetic characteristics, disability, or a conviction for an offence for which a pardon has been granted or in respect of which a record suspension has been ordered.
In accordance with the RCMP's bias-free policing policy, the RCMP's police intervention reporting (known as Subject Behaviour/Officer Response [SB/OR] reporting) does not currently capture the racialized or ethnic identity of the subjects that officers interact with. However, during RCMP Commissioner Lucki's June 23, 2020 testimony before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, she committed to working with the Federal Privacy Commissioner to review this reporting practice with the goal of developing an approach to collecting and reporting race-based data for police interactions and interventions. Learn more about this initiative.
The Commissioner agrees that it is critically important for Canadians to feel protected by the police and is committed to take whatever steps are required to enhance trust between the RCMP and the communities we serve. Body-worn video provides increased transparency, while also providing a first-person view of what a police officer encounters, often in highly dynamic and tense situations. The RCMP continually reviews its policies, procedures and equipment to ensure it is using the most effective tools in law enforcement. We have reviewed previous research and studies to draw best practices, with the desire to implement body-worn cameras across the RCMP. We will continue to work closely with the Office of the Privacy Commissioner to ensure any concerns they have are addressed. The Commissioner has confirmed that the RCMP will engage in work and discussions with policing partners on a broader rollout of body-worn cameras. Learn more about this initiative.
Police intervention
Section 25 of the Criminal Code provides police officers with the ability to use force in the lawful execution of their duties, as long as they are acting on reasonable grounds. In other words, the use of force must be necessary, proportional to the threat level, judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene (not based on hindsight), and lawful (the execution of an officer's duties was in accordance with the law).
The RCMP is the primary police of jurisdiction for approximately 22 per cent of Canada's population and responds to almost three million occurrences each year. Occurrences are calls for service or something that is self-generated by a police officer, like stopping a driver they believe is impaired. Applications of intervention options account for approximately one in every 1,268 RCMP occurrences, or 0.1 per cent of all occurrences. That means that 99.9 per cent of RCMP occurrences are resolved naturally or with communication/de-escalation. Importantly, the number of occurrences does not include the countless daily interactions police officers have with the public without incident (for example, some traffic stops, community involvement and engagement, school liaison officer functions, regular patrols, recruiting, etc.).
Communication is the preferred intervention for any situation and is to be used whenever tactically feasible, assuming it does not increase risk to the public and/or police. When communicating with an individual, police officers are taught to remain calm and in control, while providing clear direction. This allows time for the individual to respond, as well as time for the officer to determine how best to resolve the situation. While gathering information for assessing risk, verbal and non-verbal communication can be used to build a rapport with the individual. The use of communication, both verbal and non-verbal, can be extremely effective in resolving a situation.
When police are required to intervene in a given situation, it is, by nature, complex, dynamic, and constantly evolving, often in a highly charged atmosphere. It requires split-second, calculated decision-making, based on the officer's individual risk assessment. Sometimes these interventions are captured on smartphones or video surveillance systems. These videos often capture incidents from different viewpoints and perspectives. Context, background, previous information, or information provided to an officer prior to their arrival at an incident is not always captured. These are some of the many pieces of information that are processed by a responding officer in completing their risk assessment. Additionally, this information assists in making a determination about the requirement to use intervention options, including the type or amount required, as well as ensuring that it is necessary, proportional, reasonable, and lawful.
Incident management/Intervention model
The Incident Management Intervention Model (IMIM) is what RCMP officers use to assess and manage risk in all encounters with the public. It helps officers determine what intervention is needed by continually assessing risk, based on the totality of the situation. This includes tactical considerations, the officer's perceptions, situational factors, and the subject's behaviour(s). Whether it is verbal de-escalation or the use of an intervention option, the IMIM and its related training material assist officers in working through the decision-making process when it comes to interactions with the public. The IMIM is introduced in the second week at the RCMP Academy, Depot, and then integrated into all other relevant aspects of cadet training for the remaining 24 weeks. After leaving Depot, annual IMIM recertification training is mandatory for all officers.
Note
In April 2021, the RCMP updated the IMIM annual re-certification training and the IMIM graphic to place more emphasis on communication, crisis intervention, and de-escalation. Crisis intervention and de-escalation now surround the graphic, emphasizing de-escalation as the preferred result of any interaction.
Subject behaviour/Officer response reporting
To enhance accountability and transparency, in 2010, the RCMP strengthened its police intervention reporting requirements to include all intervention options. The Subject Behaviour/Officer Response (SB/OR) reporting application was created to provide RCMP officers with a tool to assist them in properly explaining the circumstances in which police intervention options were used. An SB/OR report captures occurrence information, environmental and situational factors, a description of the subject's behaviour and the officer's corresponding response, injuries, if any, to the subject and the officer, and a detailed description of how the event unfolded. It is important to remember that this information is based on each officer's individual perceptions at the time of the event, and what those perceptions meant to the officer.
SB/OR reports are mandatory for all officers who apply/display:
- physical control hard, intermediate weapons, firearms, police service dogs, specialty munitions, and/or "other" (that is, weapon of opportunity)
- physical control soft resulting in an injury to the subject, officer, or other person
All SB/OR reports are reviewed at the supervisory level and further review and oversight is provided at the provincial/territorial level where the incident occurred. Nationally, additional oversight is provided and SB/OR reports are periodically reviewed or audited for accuracy and adherence to policy. An SB/OR report provides additional context around incidents where police intervention is used and provides statistical data on the prevalence of these types of encounters in relation to overall police occurrences.
SB/OR data allow for evidence-based decision-making for the development of policy, training, and equipment. By examining SB/OR reporting, we can determine areas that require further training and development, based on real-world encounters. This allows the RCMP to focus on areas with the greatest impact. As we work towards ensuring that frontline officers are as prepared as possible when situations arise that require them to physically intervene, it is always framed by the fact that the vast majority of our interactions with the public do not require physical intervention at all.
SB/OR reporting also provides the RCMP with the opportunity to be transparent with the public when it comes to the use of police intervention options. Data from SB/OR reports provide the information necessary to produce this report.
Training
In the interest of public and police safety, police intervention training is continually examined to determine best practices. Communication and de-escalation are invaluable tools in ensuring the public and police are as safe as possible; unfortunately, this does not always resolve a situation, and physical intervention may be required. The following sections outline some of the training that RCMP police officers receive in the areas of crisis intervention, de-escalation, and police intervention options.
Cadet training at Depot
The Cadet Training Program (CTP) includes a problem-based curriculum designed to teach policing through integrated, realistic, life-like situations. It provides a dynamic, adult-focused learning environment. Learning activities include case studies, scenarios, role-playing, guided discussions, demonstrations, and practical exercises. The CTP is an extensive 26-week basic training program broken down into the following disciplines: Applied Police Sciences, Police Defensive Tactics, Operational Conditioning, Firearms, Police Driving, and Drill and Deportment. The objectives of the CTP are consistent with the RCMP's values, the IMIM training, and the operational framework known as CAPRA (Clients / Acquire and Analyze / Partnerships / Response /Assess), which is a problem-solving model to help define the competencies necessary for effective community policing.
At the beginning of training, cadets in the CTP are introduced to CAPRA, the IMIM, negotiation, mediation, and conflict resolution. Both CAPRA and the IMIM training highlight the importance of using communication skills in policing situations. CAPRA is integrated into the IMIM and its training, as it assists in the primary function of police, which is to help resolve problems. Communication is one of the key factors in achieving this goal, whether a police intervention is necessary or not.
The curriculum builds upon this foundation by introducing cadets to de-escalation skills, which they then apply to a full day of scenarios in which the clients are in various states of emotional distress. They continue to develop and apply their de-escalation skills throughout the remainder of training in Applied Police Sciences, Police Defensive Tactics, and Firearms scenarios.
Cadets are also introduced to intervention and de-escalation techniques specifically designed for managing policing situations in which the client is experiencing a mental health crisis. They are then provided with the opportunity to apply these techniques in scenarios involving an actor portraying a client in crisis due to a mental health issue. In addition, the cadets' ability to apply de-escalation skills are informally and formally assessed at numerous points in the CTP.
Cadets learn other intervention options in addition to communication, primarily in Police Defensive Tactics and Firearms. They are guided in the application of these options by the IMIM training, CAPRA, and the principles of conducting a continuous risk assessment to ensure public and police safety. The intervention options include police presence, various soft and hard physical control techniques, oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray (better known as pepper spray), baton, carotid control technique (also referred to as vascular neck restraint), pistol, shotgun, and carbine. Not only do cadets acquire the skills for performing the techniques and using the tools, but more importantly, they are given many opportunities to apply their understanding of Section 25 of the Criminal Code, CAPRA, and risk assessment in diverse scenarios in which they are informally and formally assessed.
Learn more about the cadet training at Depot.
Learn more about updates to the Cadet Training Program.
In-service training
In-service training provides police officers with the skills required to support their primary duty of preserving and protecting life. Knowing that the primary objective of any intervention is public safety, and that officer safety is essential to public safety, in-service training focuses on the skills required to safely handle the wide range of situations that can occur within a policing landscape. RCMP officers must be prepared to perform under diverse and adverse conditions, in a variety of communities (urban, rural, isolated postings), and use many types of equipment. As a result, regular recertification and mandated refresher training are required throughout an officer's career to maintain their competencies.
The vast number of competencies that must be addressed through in-service training are covered in a host of courses including:
- crisis intervention and de-escalation
- operational skills maintenance/block training (including first aid)
- IMIM recertification
- immediate action rapid deployment (IARD)
- initial critical incident response (ICIR)
Intervention option-specific courses include:
- firearms
- conducted energy weapons (CEW), commonly known as TASERTM
- extended range impact weapons (ERIW)
Training on intervention options must be meaningful, credible, defendable, informed by research (for example, medical, legal, and human factors), and enable on-the-job performance.
Crisis intervention and de-escalation
Police officers are often the first responders on scene when someone is experiencing a mental health crisis. Police have a critical role to play when responding and interacting with a person with a mental illness or a person in crisis. While police officers are not medical professionals and cannot diagnose individuals, it is important for the police to have an understanding of mental illnesses, including the signs and symptoms of distress, in order to conduct effective risk assessments and de-escalate a mental health crisis, whenever it is tactically feasible.
Addressing the mental health needs of individuals and communities requires empathy, patience, and awareness on the part of first responders. Through crisis intervention and de-escalation techniques, many mental health crises can be managed with decreased risk to the individual, the public, and police officers.
The RCMP has strengthened crisis intervention and de-escalation training for all its officers. Since 2016, an online training course on crisis intervention and de-escalation has been mandatory for all RCMP officers. The course takes approximately three hours and is available through the RCMP's e-learning portal. This mandatory training helps police officers determine when and how to use crisis intervention and de-escalation techniques, and complements the training cadets receive at Depot as well as other training offered in RCMP divisions and detachments. The purpose of the course is to ensure that RCMP officers will be able to use crisis intervention and de-escalation techniques, when tactically feasible, to effectively manage these situations, including incidents involving a person with a mental illness or a person in crisis. The course includes a module on some of the major mental illnesses and their observable behaviours, which can assist police officers in tailoring their approach to the person in crisis.
Since April 2021, crisis intervention and de-escalation training is now incorporated into annual IMIM re-certification training. Scenarios involving crisis intervention and de-escalation training are also in place as part of regular, in-person, operational skills maintenance training. The RCMP recognizes that even in situations where crisis intervention and de-escalation techniques can be used, additional police intervention may still be necessary to protect the individual or others.
Learn more about this initiative.
The RCMP, like other police agencies, is very supportive of a collaborative approach for people in crisis, and for individuals experiencing symptoms of distress or addiction. Some communities across Canada have mobile mental health support and outreach services, typically in the form of a psychiatric nurse. In areas where a joint mental health response is available, and when situational factors permit, national RCMP policy guidance states that officers should consult with mental health personnel first. However, the establishment of such joint mental health responses is contingent on resources and support from provincial and municipal health services. Mobile mental health resources are not available in all jurisdictions, leaving RCMP officers to respond to these calls unsupported in the vast majority of cases.
Operational skills maintenance and block training
Operational skills maintenance or operational skills training is the process for police officers to remain qualified (that is, maintain the certification required to carry intervention options) in the core elements required for policing duties. Officers are required to participate in block training exercises to refresh their skills and must recertify on the use of oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray (commonly known as pepper spray), the baton, and the carotid control technique every three years. Officers must also refresh their skills and recertify on the pistol (annually), IMIM training (annually; scenario-based training every three years), and first aid. The skills delivered in block training build on the prior learning officers acquired during the CTP. A national, standardized program for block training has been developed, and is in the process of being implemented across the country.
Scenario-based training is an effective means of replicating real-life, high-stress situations in a safe and controlled training environment. As part of refresher training, officers complete scenarios, which incorporate real-time decision-making, the IMIM, and de-escalation techniques related to mental illnesses/a person in crisis. The scenarios are specifically designed, based on SB/OR data, to represent real police encounters. Officers are expected to conduct a risk assessment in order to determine the level of intervention necessary to control the situation and to then articulate the rationale behind their response based on the totality of the situation. The scenarios are designed to expose officers to a variety of subject behaviours. While some scenarios are designed to be high-stress, low-frequency situations, many more are representative of everyday police interactions requiring officer presence and communication, de-escalation, and/or an intervention using intermediate weapons.
Immediate action rapid deployment
Immediate action rapid deployment (IARD) training, initially introduced during the CTP, provides police officers with the skills necessary to respond to, and intervene in, an active threat incident. Active threats involve individuals who are attempting to claim as many lives and cause as much damage as possible, in a single event. The objective of the training is to learn how to preserve and protect life by stopping the threat. In-service scenario-based training focuses on the integration of activities, skills, and tools to assist in responding to critical incidents.
Initial critical incident response
Initial critical incident response (ICIR) training is designed to teach police officers who are first to arrive at the scene of a critical incident how to take command of the situation, and respond in a logical and methodical fashion. Critical incidents can involve active threats, non-active threats (situations in which an individual or group has the ability and the intent to commit an act of serious violence against a specific target in the immediate future), or life-threatening disasters. The primary objective in every type of critical incident is to preserve and protect life. The training provides instruction regarding the appropriate response methodology based on the specific threat that is being faced.
Intervention option-specific training
In-service training is provided to support the safe and appropriate operation of a range of supplemental tools, including firearms (for example, shotgun, rifle, and patrol carbine), and less-lethal intervention options (the CEW and ERIW).
Police intervention options data and trends analysis
Methodology
On July 19, 2021, an extract was taken of the SB/OR database to provide a snapshot of the data for the period of January 1, 2020, to December 31, 2020. The dataset contained information from 6,030 completed SB/OR reports End note 2, which included approximately 4,840 occurrences, 5,683 subjects, and 7,853 police intervention options. Any additions, deletions, or modifications made after this date will not be represented in the data.
Trends in police intervention (2010-2020)
In 2020, the RCMP entered approximately 2.96 million occurrences End note 3 into RCMP records management systems and there were 2,337 encounters involving reportable applications of police intervention options End note 4. Therefore, in 2020, applications of police intervention options accounted for 0.08 per cent of the total number of RCMP occurrences, or one encounter involving police intervention options for every 1,268 occurrences. This indicates that approximately 99.9 per cent of RCMP encounters are resolved naturally or successfully de-escalated by officers without the need for the use of police intervention options.
As per Figure 1, there has been a general decline in the application of police intervention options since 2010. Compared to 2019 (0.075 per cent), which marked the lowest rate of applications of police intervention options since 2010, there was a slight increase in the rate of applications of police intervention options in 2020 (0.079 per cent). See Figure 1 – Text version for a breakdown by year.
Note
The RCMP is contracted to provide frontline policing services to all provinces and territories, except for "C" Division (Québec) and "O" Division (Ontario), as they both have their own provincial police services (Ontario Provincial Police and Sûreté du Québec). "C" Division, "O" Division, and National Division (the National Capital Region), therefore typically have low rates of applications of police intervention options given that the RCMP is not the police of primary jurisdiction in these areas. More information on contract policing can be found on the RCMP's website.
In 2020, in the provinces and territories where the RCMP is the police of primary jurisdiction (contract police service), the lowest rate of applications of police intervention options was in Prince Edward Island (0.054 per cent), while the highest rate was in Nunavut (0.175 per cent). See Table 1 for a breakdown by division (province/territory) in 2020.
Figure 1 - Text version
Year | Application of police intervention options |
---|---|
2010 | 0.13% |
2011 | 0.12% |
2012 | 0.11% |
2013 | 0.10% |
2014 | 0.09% |
2015 | 0.09% |
2016 | 0.08% |
2017 | 0.08% |
2018 | 0.08% |
2019 | 0.08% |
2020 | 0.08% |
Total for the years | 0.09% |
Division (Province/Territory) | Application of police intervention options |
---|---|
B Division (NL) | 0.087% |
C Division (QC) | 0.028% |
D Division (MB) | 0.069% |
E Division (BC) | 0.082% |
F Division (SK) | 0.073% |
G Division (NWT) | 0.129% |
H Division (NS) | 0.063% |
J Division (NB) | 0.071% |
K Division (AB) | 0.079% |
L Division (PEI) | 0.054% |
M Division (YK) | 0.067% |
National Division (NCR) | 0.009% |
O Division (ON) | 0.074% |
V Division (NU) | 0.175% |
Total | 0.079% |
Since 2010, there has been an average of approximately 4,700 occurrences each year where police intervention options were used; 2,600 of these occurrences involved an officer applying an intervention option and 2,100 involved an officer drawing and displaying their intervention option as a deterrent (see Figure 2 – Text version for a breakdown by year). While the overall use of police intervention options has remained relatively stable over time, there appears to be a slight decrease in officers applying their intervention options, and an increase in drawing and displaying their intervention options as a deterrent (see Figure 2). See Table 2 for a breakdown by division (province/territory) in 2020.
Figure 2 - Text version
Year | Police intervention options | ||
---|---|---|---|
Applied | Drawn and displayed (deterrent) only | Used (applied and drawn and displayed) | |
2010 | 3,555 | 1,427 | 4,982 |
2011 | 3,227 | 1,820 | 5,047 |
2012 | 2,980 | 1,903 | 4,883 |
2013 | 2,598 | 1,984 | 4,582 |
2014 | 2,326 | 2,074 | 4,400 |
2015 | 2,406 | 2,390 | 4,796 |
2016 | 2,236 | 2,332 | 4,568 |
2017 | 2,128 | 2,099 | 4,227 |
2018 | 2,202 | 2,058 | 4,260 |
2019 | 2,295 | 2,381 | 4,676 |
2020 | 2,337 | 2,503 | 4,840 |
Total for the years | 28,290 | 22,971 | 51,261 |
Division (Province/Territory) | Applied | Drawn and displayed (deterrent) only | Used (applied and drawn and displayed) |
---|---|---|---|
B Division (NL) | 53 | 56 | 109 |
C Division (QC) | 3 | 6 | 9 |
D Division (MB) | 140 | 206 | 346 |
E Division (BC) | 1,000 | 1,002 | 2,002 |
F Division (SK) | 236 | 356 | 592 |
G Division (NWT) | 56 | 42 | 98 |
H Division (NS) | 86 | 81 | 167 |
J Division (NB) | 108 | 77 | 185 |
K Division (AB) | 567 | 633 | 1,200 |
L Division (PEI) | 10 | 9 | 19 |
M Division (YK) | 16 | 9 | 25 |
National Division (NCR) | 1 | 1 | 2 |
O Division (ON) | 3 | 3 | 6 |
V Division (NU) | 58 | 22 | 80 |
Total | 2,337 | 2,503 | 4,840 |
The yearly rate of officers' use of intervention options more clearly demonstrates the downward trend in applications of police intervention options, and the increase in deterrence (see Figure 3). Specifically, Figure 3 – Text version indicates that in 2010, in the majority of cases involving the use of police intervention options (71 per cent), the intervention was applied; whereas 29 per cent of the time the intervention option was only drawn and displayed. However, by 2020, less than half (48 per cent) of occurrences involved the application of an intervention option and 52 per cent involved the use of drawing and displaying an intervention option.
In 2020, in the provinces and territories where the RCMP is the police of primary jurisdiction, the rate of drawing and displaying intervention options as a deterrent ranged from 28 per cent in Nunavut to 60 per cent in Manitoba and Saskatchewan. See Table 3 for a breakdown by division (province/territory) in 2020.
Figure 3 - Text version
Year | Police intervention options | |
---|---|---|
Applied | Drawn and displayed (deterrent) only | |
2010 | 71% | 29% |
2011 | 64% | 36% |
2012 | 61% | 39% |
2013 | 57% | 43% |
2014 | 53% | 47% |
2015 | 50% | 50% |
2016 | 49% | 51% |
2017 | 50% | 50% |
2018 | 52% | 48% |
2019 | 49% | 51% |
2020 | 48% | 52% |
Total for the years | 55% | 45% |
Division (Province/Territory) | Applied | Drawn and displayed (deterrent) only |
---|---|---|
B Division (NL) | 49% | 51% |
C Division (QC) | 33% | 67% |
D Division (MB) | 40% | 60% |
E Division (BC) | 50% | 50% |
F Division (SK) | 40% | 60% |
G Division (NWT) | 57% | 43% |
H Division (NS) | 51% | 49% |
J Division (NB) | 58% | 42% |
K Division (AB) | 47% | 53% |
L Division (PEI) | 53% | 47% |
M Division (YK) | 64% | 36% |
National Division (NCR) | 50% | 50% |
O Division (ON) | 50% | 50% |
V Division (NU) | 73% | 28% |
Total | 48% | 52% |
Situational factors End note 5(2020)
Occurrence types
In the occurrences where police intervention options were applied in 2020, the most common occurrence types were assaults on police officers (19 per cent), occurrences related to the Mental Health Act (10 per cent), and occurrences in which a subject resisted/obstructed a peace officer (8 per cent; see Table 4).
Most common occurrence types | Count | % |
---|---|---|
Assault on police officer | 438 | 19% |
Mental Health Act | 229 | 10% |
Resists/Obstructs peace officer | 177 | 8% |
Assault | 174 | 7% |
Break and enter | 107 | 5% |
Mischief | 90 | 4% |
Uttering threats against a person | 84 | 4% |
Assault on police officer with weapon or causing bodily harm | 72 | 3% |
Assault with weapon or causing bodily harm | 68 | 3% |
Cause a disturbance | 64 | 3% |
Possession of weapon for dangerous purpose | 55 | 2% |
Gender
In the occurrences where police intervention options were applied in 2020, the perceived gender of most subjects was male (86.8 per cent), followed by female (13.1 per cent), and "other" (0.1 per cent).
Emotionally disturbed persons
Emotionally disturbed persons refer to those in an agitated state due to any or several of the following reasons: a person is in emotional distress, a person is in crisis and is showing a loss of touch with reality, a person is under the influence of a substance, and/or a person is perceived or known to have a mental disorder. In occurrences where police intervention options were applied in 2020, 32 per cent of subjects were perceived to be emotionally disturbed (see Figure 4). In the provinces and territories where the RCMP is the police of primary jurisdiction, the per cent of subjects that were perceived to be emotionally disturbed ranged from 28 per cent in Alberta to 47.1 per cent Nova Scotia. See Table 5 for a breakdown by division (province/territory).
Learn more about the RCMP's work to support greater integration of community, health, and social services.
Figure 4 - Text version
Was the subject perceived to be emotionally disturbed? | Percentage |
---|---|
Yes | 32.1% |
No | 67.9% |
Division (Province/Territory) | Subject perceived to be emotionally disturbed | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Yes | No | Total | ||||
Count | Percent | Count | Percent | Count | Percent | |
B Division (NL) | 25 | 44.6% | 31 | 55.4% | 56 | 100.0% |
C Division (QC) | 0 | 0.0% | 3 | 100.0% | 3 | 100.0% |
D Division (MB) | 44 | 29.5% | 105 | 70.5% | 149 | 100.0% |
E Division (BC) | 348 | 33.3% | 696 | 66.7% | 1,044 | 100.0% |
F Division (SK) | 77 | 30.2% | 178 | 69.8% | 255 | 100.0% |
G Division (NWT) | 17 | 28.8% | 42 | 71.2% | 59 | 100.0% |
H Division (NS) | 41 | 47.1% | 46 | 52.9% | 87 | 100.0% |
J Division (NB) | 37 | 31.6% | 80 | 68.4% | 117 | 100.0% |
K Division (AB) | 165 | 28.0% | 424 | 72.0% | 589 | 100.0% |
L Division (PEI) | 4 | 36.4% | 7 | 63.6% | 11 | 100.0% |
M Division (YK) | 5 | 31.3% | 11 | 68.8% | 16 | 100.0% |
National Division (NCR) | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 100.0% | 1 | 100.0% |
O Division (ON) | 0 | 0.0% | 3 | 100.0% | 3 | 100.0% |
V Division (NU) | 22 | 37.9% | 36 | 62.1% | 58 | 100.0% |
Total | 785 | 32.1% | 1,663 | 67.9% | 2,448 | 100.0% |
Substance use
In occurrences where police intervention options were applied in 2020, 69 per cent of subjects were perceived to be under the influence of drugs, alcohol, and/or inhalants (see Figure 5). In the provinces and territories where the RCMP is the police of primary jurisdiction, the per cent of subjects that were perceived to be under the influence of drugs, alcohol, and/or inhalants were highest in the North (approximately 86 per cent). See Table 6 for a breakdown by division (province/territory).
Figure 5 - Text version
Was the subject perceived to be under the influence of drugs, alcohol, and/or inhalants? | Percentage |
---|---|
Yes | 69.1% |
No | 30.9% |
Division (Province/Territory) | Subject perceived to be under the influence of drugs, alcohol, and/or inhalants | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Yes | No | Total | ||||
Count | Percent | Count | Percent | Count | Percent | |
B Division (NL) | 47 | 83.9% | 9 | 16.1% | 56 | 100.0% |
C Division (QC) | 0 | 0.0% | 3 | 100.0% | 3 | 100.0% |
D Division (MB) | 119 | 79.9% | 30 | 20.1% | 149 | 100.0% |
E Division (BC) | 611 | 58.5% | 433 | 41.5% | 1,044 | 100.0% |
F Division (SK) | 203 | 79.6% | 52 | 20.4% | 255 | 100.0% |
G Division (NWT) | 51 | 86.4% | 8 | 13.6% | 59 | 100.0% |
H Division (NS) | 60 | 69.0% | 27 | 31.0% | 87 | 100.0% |
J Division (NB) | 73 | 62.4% | 44 | 37.6% | 117 | 100.0% |
K Division (AB) | 458 | 77.8% | 131 | 22.2% | 589 | 100.0% |
L Division (PEI) | 6 | 54.5% | 5 | 45.5% | 11 | 100.0% |
M Division (YK) | 14 | 87.5% | 2 | 12.5% | 16 | 100.0% |
National Division (NCR) | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 100.0% | 1 | 100.0% |
O Division (ON) | 0 | 0.0% | 3 | 100.0% | 3 | 100.0% |
V Division (NU) | 49 | 84.5% | 9 | 15.5% | 58 | 100.0% |
Total | 1691 | 69.1% | 757 | 30.9% | 2,448 | 100.0% |
Weapons
In occurrences where police intervention options were applied in 2020, 51 per cent of subjects were perceived to be in possession of a weapon (see Figure 6). In the provinces and territories where the RCMP is the police of primary jurisdiction, the per cent of subjects that were perceived to be in possession of a weapon ranged from 24.1 per cent in Nunavut to 72.7 per cent in Prince Edward Island. See Table 7 for a breakdown by division (province/territory).
Figure 6 - Text version
Was the subject perceived or believed to be in possession of a weapon? | Percentage |
---|---|
Yes | 51.1% |
No | 48.9% |
Division (Province/Territory) | Subject perceived or believed to be in possession of a weapon | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Yes | No | Total | ||||
Count | Percent | Count | Percent | Count | Percent | |
B Division (NL) | 18 | 32.1% | 38 | 67.9% | 56 | 100.0% |
C Division (QC) | 2 | 66.7% | 1 | 33.3% | 3 | 100.0% |
D Division (MB) | 62 | 41.6% | 87 | 58.4% | 149 | 100.0% |
E Division (BC) | 570 | 54.6% | 474 | 45.4% | 1,044 | 100.0% |
F Division (SK) | 118 | 46.3% | 137 | 53.7% | 255 | 100.0% |
G Division (NWT) | 18 | 30.5% | 41 | 69.5% | 59 | 100.0% |
H Division (NS) | 45 | 51.7% | 42 | 48.3% | 87 | 100.0% |
J Division (NB) | 68 | 58.1% | 49 | 41.9% | 117 | 100.0% |
K Division (AB) | 321 | 54.5% | 268 | 45.5% | 589 | 100.0% |
L Division (PEI) | 8 | 72.7% | 3 | 27.3% | 11 | 100.0% |
M Division (YK) | 5 | 31.3% | 11 | 68.8% | 16 | 100.0% |
National Division (NCR) | 0 | 0.0% | 1 | 100.0% | 1 | 100.0% |
O Division (ON) | 2 | 66.7% | 1 | 33.3% | 3 | 100.0% |
V Division (NU) | 14 | 24.1% | 44 | 75.9% | 58 | 100.0% |
Total | 1251 | 51.1% | 1,197 | 48.9% | 2,448 | 100.0% |
Intervention options (2020)
Physical control soft
Physical control soft techniques may be used to cause distraction in order to facilitate the application of a control technique. Distraction techniques include, but are not limited to, open hand strikes and pressure points. Physical control soft techniques also include escorting and/or come-along techniques, joint locks, soft takedowns, and non-resistant handcuffing, which have a lower probability of causing injury. Physical control soft is only required to be reported when it results in an injury to the subject, officer, or other person; however, officers often report these interventions, even without an injury, to demonstrate an escalation and/or de-escalation in police intervention.
In 2020, reported physical control soft techniques were used by officers 389 times. Specifically, officers applied pressure points 22 times (5.7 per cent), joint locks 54 times (13.9 per cent), soft takedowns 199 times (51.2 per cent), and escort/come-along techniques 114 times (29.3 per cent). See Figure 7 – Text version for a breakdown by division (province/territory). Reportable physical control soft techniques accounted for 5.1 per cent of all police intervention options used (see Appendix A) and 12.8 per cent of all police intervention options applied (see Appendix B).
Figure 7 - Text version
Division (Province/Territory) | Deployment type | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Pressure points | Joint locks | Soft takedown | Escort/Come-along techniques | Total | |
Count | Count | Count | Count | Count | |
B Division (NL) | 1 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 8 |
C Division (QC) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
D Division (MB) | 1 | 10 | 19 | 10 | 40 |
E Division (BC) | 6 | 18 | 86 | 42 | 152 |
F Division (SK) | 6 | 7 | 18 | 13 | 44 |
G Division (NWT) | 3 | 2 | 6 | 2 | 13 |
H Division (NS) | 1 | 0 | 8 | 3 | 12 |
J Division (NB) | 0 | 1 | 6 | 17 | 24 |
K Division (AB) | 4 | 14 | 41 | 21 | 80 |
L Division (PEI) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
M Division (YK) | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
National Division (NCR) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
O Division (ON) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
V Division (NU) | 0 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 11 |
Total | 22 | 54 | 199 | 114 | 389 |
Physical control hard
Physical control hard techniques are intended to stop (or change) a subject's behaviour or allow the application of a control technique, and have a higher probability of causing injury to both parties involved. They may include hard takedowns and empty hand strikes such as punches and kicks. The carotid control technique, also referred to as the vascular neck restraint (VNR), is also a physical control hard technique. However, RCMP training and policy limit the use of this technique to times where an officer fears grievous bodily harm or death for themselves or any other person. The carotid control technique/VNR is not a chokehold or respiratory restraint. Rather, the carotid control technique/VNR is "a technique that applies lateral compression to the vascular structure of the subject's neck resulting in partial or complete occlusion of the carotid arteries, as well as the occlusion of the jugular veins." End note 6 Importantly, a properly applied carotid control technique/VNR "will not compress or harm the structures located in the anterior portion of the throat, nor is it likely to cause harm to the cervical vertebrae; the subject's ability to breathe is not adversely affected during VNR compression." End note 7 When properly applied, the carotid control technique/VNR "is neither likely nor intended to cause serious medical outcomes." End note 8 In 2016, the carotid control technique/VNR training was reviewed by the RCMP to ensure best practices are employed, based on current police intervention option trends in Canada and in the law enforcement community.
On June 10, 2020, RCMP Commissioner Lucki publicly stated that the RCMP would review its use of the carotid control/VNR technique. As part of this review, the RCMP is participating in a study with a group of experienced police use of force researchers, including both criminologists and physicians, to provide a valid estimate of the incidence of injuries, including operational and training settings, related to the carotid control/VNR technique. This includes an examination of all operational applications of the carotid control/VNR technique from 2010 to 2020, as well as approximately 400,000 applications of the techniques in training from 2010 to 2019. The RCMP's involvement in this study will provide objective medical evidence of the risks and benefits of this intervention. This is critical to making evidence-based policy decisions on whether to continue teaching this technique and, if so, under what circumstances it should be employed. In 2020, physical control hard techniques were used by officers 1,044 times. Specifically, officers applied stuns and strikes 734 times (70.3 per cent), hard takedowns 285 times (27.3 per cent), and the carotid control technique/VNR 25 times (2.4 per cent). See Figure 8 – Text version for a breakdown by division (province/territory). Physical control hard techniques accounted for 13.8 per cent of all police intervention options used (see Appendix A) and 34.4 per cent of all police intervention options applied (see Appendix B).
Figure 8 - Text version
Division (Province/Territory) | Deployment type | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
Stuns/Strikes | Hard takedown | Carotid control/Vascular neck restraint (VNR) | Total | |
Count | Count | Count | Count | |
B Division (NL) | 19 | 14 | 0 | 33 |
C Division (QC) | 1 | 3 | 0 | 4 |
D Division (MB) | 59 | 17 | 0 | 76 |
E Division (BC) | 317 | 96 | 10 | 423 |
F Division (SK) | 86 | 38 | 2 | 126 |
G Division (NWT) | 26 | 4 | 0 | 30 |
H Division (NS) | 23 | 9 | 0 | 32 |
J Division (NB) | 18 | 9 | 1 | 28 |
K Division (AB) | 148 | 81 | 9 | 238 |
L Division (PEI) | 3 | 4 | 1 | 8 |
M Division (YK) | 8 | 1 | 0 | 9 |
National Division (NCR) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
O Division (ON) | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
V Division (NU) | 26 | 8 | 2 | 36 |
Total | 734 | 285 | 25 | 1,044 |
Intermediate weapons (2020)
Oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray and the baton fall within this heading, along with less lethal weapons, whose primary use is not intended to cause serious injury or death. Less lethal weapons include the CEW and the extended range impact weapon (ERIW).
Oleoresin capsicum spray
OC spray (commonly known as pepper spray) is one of the intermediate weapons carried by RCMP officers. It has an effective range of 1 to 3 metres; therefore, officers must be close to the subject prior to deployment. In 2016, OC spray training was reviewed by the RCMP to ensure best practices are employed, based on current police intervention option trends and advancements in Canada and in the law enforcement community.
In 2020, OC spray was used by officers 275 times, of which it was applied 253 times (92 per cent). OC spray is rarely used as a deterrent (for example, drawn and displayed or pointed). See Figure 9 – Text version for a breakdown by division (province/territory). OC spray accounted for 3.6 per cent of all police intervention options used (see Appendix A) and 8.3 per cent of all police intervention options applied (see Appendix B).
Figure 9 - Text version
Division (Province/Territory) | Deployment type | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
Drawn and displayed | Pointed at subject | Applied | Total | |
Count | Count | Count | Count | |
B Division (NL) | 1 | 0 | 5 | 6 |
C Division (QC) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
D Division (MB) | 2 | 1 | 17 | 20 |
E Division (BC) | 2 | 4 | 104 | 110 |
F Division (SK) | 2 | 1 | 41 | 44 |
G Division (NWT) | 0 | 1 | 13 | 14 |
H Division (NS) | 0 | 0 | 7 | 7 |
J Division (NB) | 0 | 0 | 10 | 10 |
K Division (AB) | 5 | 3 | 44 | 52 |
L Division (PEI) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
M Division (YK) | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
National Division (NCR) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
O Division (ON) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
V Division (NU) | 0 | 0 | 9 | 9 |
Total | 12 | 10 | 253 | 275 |
Baton
The baton is another intermediate weapon carried by RCMP officers. The baton can be deployed in either closed mode or open mode (when the baton is extended). Open mode provides more distance between the officer and the person it is being used on. The baton is deployed from 0 to 2 feet; therefore, officers must be close to the person prior to deployment. In 2016, baton training was reviewed by the RCMP to ensure best practices are employed based on current police intervention option trends and advancements in Canada and in the law enforcement community.
The baton is rarely used by officers. In 2020, the baton was used 42 times, of which it was applied 30 times (71.4 per cent), and used as a deterrent (drawn and displayed or pointed at subject) 12 times (28.6 per cent). See Figure 10 – Text version for a breakdown by division (province/territory). The baton accounted for 0.6 per cent of all police intervention options used (see Appendix A) and 1 per cent of all police intervention options applied (see Appendix B).
Figure 10 - Text version
Division (Province/Territory) | Deployment type | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
Drawn and displayed | Pointed at subject | Applied | Total | |
Count | Count | Count | Count | |
B Division (NL) | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
C Division (QC) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
D Division (MB) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
E Division (BC) | 4 | 0 | 4 | 8 |
F Division (SK) | 0 | 0 | 6 | 6 |
G Division (NWT) | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
H Division (NS) | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
J Division (NB) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
K Division (AB) | 4 | 1 | 13 | 18 |
L Division (PEI) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
M Division (YK) | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 |
National Division (NCR) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
O Division (ON) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
V Division (NU) | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
Total | 11 | 1 | 30 | 42 |
Conducted energy weapon
One of the less lethal intermediate weapons carried by officers is the conducted energy weapon (CEW), commonly known as the TASERTM. The RCMP has been using CEWs for almost 20 years.
RCMP officers are trained to deploy the CEW in three ways:
- Probe mode means that a CEW is deployed by discharging and propelling two electrical probes, equipped with small barbs that hook onto a subject's clothing or skin, allowing electrical energy to be transferred to that subject.
- Contact mode means that the CEW is deployed by pressing or pushing an activated CEW onto a subject, allowing electrical energy to be transferred to that subject. Contact mode may include pressing or pushing the CEW with or without a cartridge inserted.
- Three-point contact mode means that the CEW is deployed by firing the two probes at close range, then moving the CEW away from the probes to press or push the CEW onto another part of the body.
Current RCMP CEW policy states that the CEW may only be used in circumstances where a subject is causing bodily harm, as defined in section 2 of the Criminal Code, End note 9 or if the officer believes on reasonable grounds that the subject will imminently cause bodily harm, as determined by the officer's assessment of the totality of the situation.
The CEW provides RCMP officers with the ability, in some situations, to communicate with the individual from a distance as the CEW has an effective range of 4.5 meters. This allows for the use of crisis intervention and de-escalation techniques, where tactically feasible. In the past several years there have been technological advancements made in the field of CEWs and The RCMP continues to research and pilot the newest models on the market to ensure that officers are equipped with the most effective less lethal intervention options available. CEW training is continually reviewed by the RCMP to ensure best practices are employed, based on current police intervention option trends and advancements in Canada and in the law enforcement community. Crisis intervention and de-escalation techniques are included in RCMP CEW training, including the scenario-based training portion.
In 2020, the CEW was used by officers 1,513 times. Specifically, officers used the CEW as a deterrent (drawn and displayed, pointed at subject, laser sight activated, or spark display activated) 783 times (51.8 per cent). The CEW was deployed in probe mode 617 times (40.8 per cent) and in contact mode 113 times (7.5 per cent). See Figure 11 – Text version for a breakdown by division (province/territory). The CEW accounted for 20 per cent of all police intervention options used (see Appendix A) and 24.1 per cent of all police intervention options applied (see Appendix B).
Figure 11 - Text version
Division (Province/Territory) | Deployment type | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Drawn and displayed | Pointed at subject | Laser sight activated | Spark display activated | Contact mode deployed | Probe mode deployed | Total | |
Count | Count | Count | Count | Count | Count | Count | |
B Division (NL) | 10 | 16 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 43 |
C Division (QC) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
D Division (MB) | 21 | 59 | 13 | 0 | 9 | 42 | 144 |
E Division (BC) | 70 | 165 | 33 | 2 | 23 | 245 | 538 |
F Division (SK) | 25 | 76 | 27 | 0 | 15 | 66 | 209 |
G Division (NWT) | 2 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 6 | 9 | 29 |
H Division (NS) | 11 | 20 | 7 | 0 | 12 | 26 | 76 |
J Division (NB) | 5 | 14 | 4 | 0 | 11 | 37 | 71 |
K Division (AB) | 52 | 90 | 34 | 1 | 31 | 165 | 373 |
L Division (PEI) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
M Division (YK) | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 5 |
National Division (NCR) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
O Division (ON) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
V Division (NU) | 4 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 11 | 22 |
Total | 201 | 452 | 127 | 3 | 113 | 617 | 1,513 |
Extended range impact weapon
The RCMP continually reviews police intervention option trends and advancements within Canada and in the law enforcement community. Based on these reviews the RCMP researches and conducts pilot studies on different less lethal intervention options. In 2017, the RCMP began a pilot project examining the utility of the 40 mm (sponge-tipped round) ERIW for general duty (frontline patrol officer) applications. Prior to the pilot, only Emergency Response Teams (ERT) and the Tactical Support Group (TSG) carried the ERIW. The driving factor in piloting the ERIW for general duty was to provide officers with an intervention option that could be used from a longer distance. The goal is to provide more time and distance from the person the officer is dealing with to allow for de-escalation and communication, when tactically feasible. Crisis intervention and de-escalation techniques are included in RCMP training on the 40 mm ERIW.
In 2020, the ERIW was used 107 times, of which it was applied 36 times (33.6 per cent) and used as a deterrent (drawn and displayed or pointed at subject) 71 times (66.4 per cent). See Figure 12 – Text version for a breakdown by division (province/territory). The ERIW accounted for 1.4 per cent of all police intervention options used (see Appendix A) and 1.2 per cent of all police intervention options applied (see Appendix B).
Figure 12 - Text version
Division (Province/Territory) | Deployment type | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
Drawn and displayed | Pointed at subject | Applied | Total | |
Count | Count | Count | Count | |
B Division (NL) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
C Division (QC) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
D Division (MB) | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
E Division (BC) | 14 | 13 | 20 | 47 |
F Division (SK) | 0 | 8 | 3 | 11 |
G Division (NWT) | 1 | 3 | 3 | 7 |
H Division (NS) | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
J Division (NB) | 3 | 0 | 2 | 5 |
K Division (AB) | 6 | 17 | 7 | 30 |
L Division (PEI) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
M Division (YK) | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
National Division (NCR) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
O Division (ON) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
V Division (NU) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Total | 25 | 46 | 36 | 107 |
Specialty munitions (2020)
General duty (frontline patrol) RCMP officers do not use specialty munitions. The specialty munitions category is used to capture the use of chemical munitions, such as 2-chlorobenzalmalonitrile (that is, CS gas, also commonly known as tear gas). They are limited to specialized groups such as ERT and the TSG, who must pass a chemical munitions course during their training to be eligible to deploy them. CS gas irritates the mucous membranes causing a burning sensation in the eyes, nose, and throat, as well as nasal discharge, and tearing and closing of the eyes. The use of this tool during critical incidents reduces the risk to officers having to enter an unknown dwelling or structure.
In 2020, specialty munitions were used 76 times. See Figure 13 – Text version for a breakdown by division (province/territory). Specialty munitions accounted for 1 per cent of all police intervention options used (see Appendix A) and 2.5 per cent of all police intervention options applied (see Appendix B).
Figure 13 - Text version
Division (Province/Territory) | Specialty munitions |
---|---|
Count | |
B Division (NL) | 0 |
C Division (QC) | 0 |
D Division (MB) | 0 |
E Division (BC) | 48 |
F Division (SK) | 4 |
G Division (NWT) | 1 |
H Division (NS) | 6 |
J Division (NB) | 6 |
K Division (AB) | 11 |
L Division (PEI) | 0 |
M Division (YK) | 0 |
National Division (NCR) | 0 |
O Division (ON) | 0 |
V Division (NU) | 0 |
Total | 76 |
"Other" (2020)
The "other" category captures an RCMP officer using a weapon of opportunity (that is, items that they do not carry as a standard intervention option, but were available at the scene), such as a flashlight, rather than a police-issued intervention option. An officer may use such an intervention, for example, when they are involved in a struggle on the ground and are unable to access their standard intervention equipment.
In 2020, "other" intervention options were used 50 times. See Figure 14 – Text version for a breakdown by division (province/territory). "Other" intervention options accounted for 0.7 per cent of all police intervention options used (see Appendix A) and 1.6 per cent of all police intervention options applied (see Appendix B).
Figure 14 - Text version
Division (Province/Territory) | “Other” (Weapon of Opportunity) |
---|---|
Count | |
B Division (NL) | 1 |
C Division (QC) | 0 |
D Division (MB) | 1 |
E Division (BC) | 21 |
F Division (SK) | 3 |
G Division (NWT) | 1 |
H Division (NS) | 6 |
J Division (NB) | 0 |
K Division (AB) | 16 |
L Division (PEI) | 0 |
M Division (YK) | 0 |
National Division (NCR) | 0 |
O Division (ON) | 1 |
V Division (NU) | 0 |
Total | 50 |
Police service dog (2020)
Police service dogs (PSD) are first and foremost a searching and tracking tool. They are used to search for subjects who have fled the scene of an investigation, subjects who are hiding or attempting to evade apprehension, and missing persons. They are also used to locate narcotics, explosives, and human remains. The RCMP has a total of 149 team positions in Police Dog Services (PDS) across the country. Of those, 131 were general duty and 18 were Specialty Detection Teams (narcotics, explosives, and human remains) in 2020. PDS handlers are responsible for their PSD, and must always keep the dog under control. When the PSD is deployed for the purpose of criminal apprehension, it is with the expectation that the dog, if required, will engage the subject with a bite. Often this is not required, as the presence and warning of the PSD alone (identification of the dog by its handler, or the dog's bark) will achieve the required change in behaviour. If a PSD is deployed and the subject's behaviour changes, the dog handler can recall their dog prior to a bite. Like other intermediate intervention options, the dog handler is required to report deployments of their dog when they believe their presence resulted in a behaviour change from the subject, regardless of whether they were deployed for the purpose of a criminal apprehension, in accordance with SB/OR policy.
All potential dog handlers attend the PDS Training Centre, located in Innisfail, Alberta. The potential dog handlers must complete the Basic Dog Handler Course (for a new handler training a potential PSD), which is a mandatory 85-day course. Once the dog handler has successfully completed the course, they must complete a minimum of eight hours per week of PDS team training during their scheduled work hours. PDS teams are required to complete an annual validation for all profiles, including tracking, obedience, small article searching, person search in a building or compound, and one of the following specialty profiles: narcotics, explosives or human remains, and apprehension. Apprehension includes two exercises. The first exercise is a "call off," which consists of the team demonstrating pre-bite control prior to the PSD being commanded to apprehend a fleeing subject. The PSD must then abort the approach without making contact with the subject on the dog handler's verbal command. The second exercise is an apprehension exercise, which consists of the team demonstrating pre-bite control while dealing with an uncooperative subject. The PSD must remain in a position of control until given the command to apprehend the subject. The PSD must release on the verbal command of the dog handler and demonstrate post-bite control while the handler conducts a search and escort of the subject.
In 2020, PSDs were used as a police intervention option 772 times. Specifically, they were applied (bite) 425 times (55.1 per cent) and used as a deterrent (presence or track only) 347 times (44.9 per cent). See Figure 15 – Text version for a breakdown by division (province/territory). PSDs accounted for 10.2 per cent of all police intervention options used (see Appendix A) and 14 per cent of all police intervention options applied (see Appendix B).
Figure 15 - Text version
Division (Province/Territory) | Deployment type | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
Presence only | Track only | Bite | Total | |
Count | Count | Count | Count | |
B Division (NL) | 4 | 2 | 4 | 10 |
C Division (QC) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
D Division (MB) | 0 | 0 | 5 | 5 |
E Division (BC) | 126 | 92 | 222 | 440 |
F Division (SK) | 1 | 22 | 26 | 49 |
G Division (NWT) | 11 | 5 | 2 | 18 |
H Division (NS) | 0 | 3 | 4 | 7 |
J Division (NB) | 0 | 0 | 17 | 17 |
K Division (AB) | 27 | 54 | 143 | 224 |
L Division (PEI) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
M Division (YK) | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 |
National Division (NCR) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
O Division (ON) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
V Division (NU) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Total | 169 | 178 | 425 | 772 |
Firearm (2020)
This intervention option primarily involves the use of conventional police firearms (for example, duty pistol, shotgun, rifle, patrol carbine). RCMP officers are trained to only use their firearms when they fear grievous bodily harm or death to themselves or any other person. With their firearm drawn and displayed or pointed at a person, an officer may attempt to de-escalate a situation through communication while being prepared to deploy lethal force, if necessary, based on the totality of the situation. Often, a firearm may be drawn and/or pointed at a person while another officer attempts crisis intervention de-escalation using communication, and/or uses other less lethal intervention options.
In 2020, firearms were used as a deterrent (drawn and displayed or pointed at a subject) by officers 3,315 times. See Figure 16 – Text version for a breakdown by division (province/territory). Firearms, when used as a deterrent, accounted for 43.7 per cent of all police intervention options used (see Appendix A).
Figure 16 - Text version
Division (Province/Territory) | Deployment type | ||
---|---|---|---|
Drawn and displayed | Pointed at subject | Total | |
Count | Count | Count | |
B Division (NL) | 23 | 33 | 56 |
C Division (QC) | 1 | 6 | 7 |
D Division (MB) | 132 | 207 | 339 |
E Division (BC) | 358 | 624 | 982 |
F Division (SK) | 216 | 350 | 566 |
G Division (NWT) | 23 | 26 | 49 |
H Division (NS) | 24 | 55 | 79 |
J Division (NB) | 30 | 74 | 104 |
K Division (AB) | 358 | 690 | 1,048 |
L Division (PEI) | 8 | 8 | 16 |
M Division (YK) | 6 | 9 | 15 |
National Division (NCR) | 1 | 2 | 3 |
O Division (ON) | 8 | 3 | 11 |
V Division (NU) | 10 | 30 | 40 |
Total | 1,198 | 2,117 | 3,315 |
Officer-involved shootings (2020) End note 10
Communication, de-escalation, and less lethal intervention options are invaluable tools in ensuring that the public and police are as safe as possible; unfortunately, this does not always resolve a situation, and lethal force (that is, discharge of a firearm) may be required. In incidents involving serious injury or death, the RCMP Act mandates that an independent civilian investigative body or external police force conduct an investigation. The RCMP will continue to review all external investigative reports and their recommendations so that necessary amendments to policy, training, equipment, and standards can be adopted to enhance public and police safety.
Officer-involved shooting trends (2010-2020)
As per Figure 17, the officer involved shooting occurrence rate has fluctuated across the years since 2010. Compared to 2019 (0.001 per cent), there was a decrease in the rate of officer-involved shooting occurrences in 2020 (0.0007 per cent). Officers discharged a firearm resulting in a fatality in 0.0005 per cent of occurrences in 2020, which is slightly above the rate in 2019 and the 11-year average, however these are still generally rare. For example, in 2020, officers discharged a firearm in approximately one in 148,000 occurrences and discharged a firearm resulting in a fatality in approximately one in 212,000 occurrences. See Figure 17 – Text version for a breakdown by year.
Figure 17 - Text version
Year | Officer-involved shootings | |
---|---|---|
Fatal | Total | |
2010 | 0.0002% | 0.0004% |
2011 | 0.0003% | 0.0008% |
2012 | 0.0002% | 0.0006% |
2013 | 0.0002% | 0.0005% |
2014 | 0.0001% | 0.0008% |
2015 | 0.0003% | 0.0012% |
2016 | 0.0002% | 0.0005% |
2017 | 0.0004% | 0.0010% |
2018 | 0.0002% | 0.0007% |
2019 | 0.0003% | 0.0010% |
2020 | 0.0005% | 0.0007% |
Total for the years | 0.0003% | 0.0008% |
From 2010 to 2020, RCMP officers were involved in 231 officer-involved shootings (an average of 21 shootings per year), of which 81 (an average of 7 shootings per year) resulted in the death of the subject (see Figure 18 – Text version). In 2020, RCMP officers were involved in 20 officer-involved shootings, of which 14 resulted in the death of the subject. This increase in fatalities in 2020 corresponds with the rise in officer-involved shootings where the subject(s) discharged a firearm (see below). Alberta accounted for 55 per cent of all officer-involved shootings and 42.9 per cent of fatalities in 2020. The frequency of officer-involved shootings in Alberta corresponds with the number of officer-involved shootings where the subject(s) discharged a firearm (see below). See Table 8 for a breakdown by division (province/territory) in 2020.
Figure 18 - Text version
Year | Officer-involved shootings | ||
---|---|---|---|
Non-fatal | Fatal | Total | |
2010 | 6 | 6 | 12 |
2011 | 13 | 7 | 20 |
2012 | 11 | 6 | 17 |
2013 | 9 | 5 | 14 |
2014 | 19 | 4 | 23 |
2015 | 24 | 8 | 32 |
2016 | 8 | 5 | 13 |
2017 | 18 | 10 | 28 |
2018 | 13 | 7 | 20 |
2019 | 23 | 9 | 32 |
2020 | 6 | 14 | 20 |
Total for the years | 150 | 81 | 231 |
Note
The non-fatal category includes five subjects that died from self-inflicted injuries, not from police discharge of a firearm. One fatal occurrence in 2016 involved the death of two subjects, for a total of 82 fatalities.
Division (Province/Territory) | Non-fatal | Fatal | Total |
---|---|---|---|
B Division (NL) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
C Division (QC) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
D Division (MB) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
E Division (BC) | 0 | 3 | 3 |
F Division (SK) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
G Division (NWT) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
H Division (NS) | 0 | 2 | 2 |
J Division (NB) | 0 | 1 | 1 |
K Division (AB) | 5 | 6 | 11 |
L Division (PEI) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
M Division (YK) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
National Division (NCR) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
O Division (ON) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
V Division (NU) | 1 | 2 | 3 |
Total | 6 | 14 | 20 |
From 2010 to 2020, there were 101 officer-involved shootings (an average of 9 per year), where the subject(s) discharged a firearm (see Figure 19). In 2020, there was an increase in the number of subject(s) who discharged a firearm, rising to 18 incidents, the highest it has been in 11 years. These incidents in 2020 resulted in the death of one RCMP officer and injury to three other officers. Alberta accounted for 50 per cent of all officer-involved shootings where a subject discharged a firearm in 2020. See Table 9 for a breakdown by division (province/territory) in 2020.
Figure 19 - Text version
Year | Officer-involved shootings | ||
---|---|---|---|
Subject(s) discharged firearms | Officers non-fatally shot | Officers fatally shot | |
2010 | 6 | 0 | 0 |
2011 | 12 | 4 | 0 |
2012 | 11 | 2 | 0 |
2013 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
2014 | 12 | 6 | 3 |
2015 | 7 | 2 | 1 |
2016 | 7 | 1 | 0 |
2017 | 7 | 0 | 0 |
2018 | 11 | 2 | 0 |
2019 | 8 | 2 | 0 |
2020 | 18 | 3 | 1 |
Total for the years | 101 | 22 | 5 |
Division (Province/Territory) | Officer-Involved Shootings | ||
---|---|---|---|
Subject(s) discharged firearm | Officers non-fatally shot | Officers fatally shot | |
B Division (NL) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
C Division (QC) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
D Division (MB) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
E Division (BC) | 4 | 0 | 0 |
F Division (SK) | 2 | 1 | 0 |
G Division (NWT) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
H Division (NS) | 2 | 1 | 1 |
J Division (NB) | 1 | 0 | 0 |
K Division (AB) | 8 | 1 | 0 |
L Division (PEI) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
M Division (YK) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
National Division (NCR) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
O Division (ON) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
V Division (NU) | 1 | 0 | 0 |
Total | 18 | 3 | 1 |
Injury proximal to the application of police intervention options (2020)
Officer injury proximal to the application of police intervention options
In occurrences where police intervention options were applied in 2020, excluding officer-involved shootings (see above), 427 (16 per cent) officers were injured. This includes 8 (0.3 per cent) who were admitted to hospital. The majority of officers (83.9 per cent) were not injured proximal to the application of police intervention options in 2020 (see Table 10).
No data | Count | % |
---|---|---|
No Injury | 2225 | 83.9% |
No Treatment Required | 263 | 9.9% |
Treated and Released | 156 | 5.9% |
Admitted to Hospital | 8 | 0.3% |
Total | 2652 | 100.0% |
Subject injury proximal to the application of police intervention options
In occurrences where police intervention options were applied in 2020, excluding officer-involved shootings (see above), 924 (37.7 per cent) subjects were injured. This includes 477 (19.5 per cent) who were transported to a hospital or clinic for treatment related to police intervention. The majority of subjects (62.3 per cent) were not injured proximal to the application of police intervention options in 2020 (see Table 11).
No data | Count | % |
---|---|---|
No Injury | 1,524 | 62.3% |
Refused Treatment | 30 | 1.2% |
No Treatment Required | 178 | 7.3% |
Treated and Medically Released at Scene/Cells | 192 | 7.8% |
Transported to Hospital/Clinic - for Condition (see note) Only | 47 | 1.9% |
Transported to Hospital/Clinic - for Condition (see note) & Injury Related to Police Intervention | 119 | 4.9% |
Transported to Hospital/Clinic - for Injury Related to Police Intervention | 358 | 14.6% |
Total | 2,448 | 100.0% |
Note
Condition refers to emotionally disturbed, drugs/alcohol, and/or a pre-existing injury that is unrelated to police intervention.
In-custody deaths proximal to the application of police intervention options (2020)
An in-custody death is defined as an incident where a person died while under police care and control, arrest, and/or detention, or while in a police facility or transport. In 2020, excluding officer-involved shootings (see Figure 19), there were three in-custody deaths proximal to the application of police intervention options. All three incidents occurred in British Columbia (BC) and were investigated by the Independent Investigations Office (IIO) of BC (see Oversight and accountability, below, for more details). In two incidents, the investigation found that the officers did not commit an offence and the matters were not referred to Crown counsel for consideration of charges. The third incident is still under investigation. The external review releases and/or reports are available at the links below:
- Death of a male while being apprehended by members of the RCMP in Whistler, BC on March 8, 2020 (final report available)
- IIO is investigating an incident in Prince George, BC (2020-067) (still under investigation)
- Death of a male while being apprehended by members of the RCMP in New Aiyansh, BC on October 13, 2020 (final report available)
Oversight and accountability
The RCMP Act provides legislated internal and external review processes to deal with issues related to officer conduct. There are also the Commissioner's Standing Orders, and operational and administrative policies in addition to the RCMP Act provisions that govern officer conduct. These processes ensure RCMP officers are accountable for all occurrences involving the use of police intervention options, including officer-involved shootings. The conduct process is found in Part IV of the RCMP Act, while the Code of Conduct is found in the RCMP Regulations. The Code of Conduct, which applies to every officer of the RCMP, establishes responsibilities and the standards for conduct, both on and off duty.
The Public Complaints Process, found in Part VII of the RCMP Act stipulates that any individual may make a public complaint concerning the on-duty conduct of any RCMP officer in the performance of their duties. Public complaints can be made directly to the RCMP, to the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP (CRCC), or to the provincial authority that is responsible for the receipt of complaints against the police in the province in which the subject matter of the complaint arose. The Chairperson for the CRCC may initiate a public complaint, if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds and it is in the public's interest to investigate an officer's conduct. Public Complaint investigations are normally completed by an officer in a supervisory rank, while Code of Conduct investigations are normally completed by experienced RCMP officers who have completed the Workplace Responsibility Investigation Course. The Serious Incidents protocol is found in Part VII.1 of the RCMP Act and mandates that an independent civilian investigative body (for example, Independent Investigations Office of British Columbia, Nova Scotia Serious Incident Response Team) or external police force conduct the investigation, whenever there is a:
- serious injury or death of an individual involving an RCMP officer
- where it appears that an RCMP officer may have contravened a provision of the Criminal Code or other statute and the matter is of a serious or sensitive nature
If there is no investigative body or other police force to investigate, Serious Incidents may be investigated by the RCMP. Internal reviews may also be completed using police intervention subject matter experts or through an Independent Officer Review (IOR). An IOR is an administrative review (fact-finding inquiry) of an officer's actions and their application of the IMIM, policies, and training that is conducted by a commissioned officer/delegate who is independent of the incident.
The RCMP Act, Commissioner's Standing Orders, and related policies, are designed to ensure transparency, accountability, and openness - mandating that an independent civilian agency or external law enforcement body conduct the investigation whenever possible. More information on public complaints can be found on the RCMP public website.
Conclusion
To promote trust, transparency, and accountability for the Canadian public, the RCMP is committed to open and proactive disclosure of annual police intervention option data. Tangible, operational change will be driven by promoting investments in evidence-based policy, training, equipment, and standards for police intervention and de-escalation across the country. Accordingly, the RCMP will continue to proactively monitor police intervention option data and make evidence-based decisions to improve public and police safety.
Further to the ongoing conversation seeking police reforms, ongoing efforts are also underway to modernize and standardize police intervention and de-escalation models, frameworks, and training to assist in strengthening public trust in police interactions. For example, in the fall of 2020, the RCMP and the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) established a National Police Chiefs' Roundtable forum for national policing leadership to work collectively on issues of importance to Canadians and the policing community. The sub-table on Crisis Intervention and De-Escalation is re-examining our current police intervention and de-escalation framework, aimed at moving towards a refreshed model developed in collaboration and engagement with partners and stakeholders. This includes consultation with provinces and territories, as well as Indigenous and racialized communities. It is critical that diverse views are heard and considered in this important work.
Learn more about the CACP's resolution on de-escalation and crisis intervention.
National leadership and a commitment by all levels of government for de-escalation training will be important to achieve the expectations of the Canadian public. Through a preservation of life and human-centered policing approach, Canadian police have opportunities for improvement through increased public transparency, enhanced decision-making and de-escalation training, modernized intervention options that enhance de-escalation, and after-action oversight and accountability.
Appendices
Appendix A
Officer response | Deployment type | Count | % |
---|---|---|---|
Physical control soft | Pressure points | 22 | 0.3% |
Joint locks | 54 | 0.7% | |
Escort/Come-along techniques | 114 | 1.5% | |
Takedown | 199 | 2.6% | |
Total | 389 | 5.1% | |
Physical control hard | Stuns/Strikes | 734 | 9.7% |
Carotid control/Vascular neck restraint (VNR) | 25 | 0.3% | |
Takedown | 285 | 3.8% | |
Total | 1,044 | 13.8% | |
Oleoresin capsicum spray | Drawn and displayed | 12 | 0.2% |
Pointed at subject | 10 | 0.1% | |
Applied | 253 | 3.3% | |
Total | 275 | 3.6% | |
Conducted energy weapon | Laser sight activated | 127 | 1.7% |
Spark display activated | 3 | 0.0% | |
Contact mode deployed | 113 | 1.5% | |
Probe deployed | 617 | 8.1% | |
Drawn and displayed | 201 | 2.7% | |
Pointed at subject | 452 | 6.0% | |
Total | 1,513 | 20.0% | |
Baton | Drawn and displayed | 11 | 0.1% |
Pointed at subject | 1 | 0.0% | |
Applied | 30 | 0.4% | |
Total | 42 | 0.6% | |
Extended range impact weapon | Drawn and displayed | 25 | 0.3% |
Pointed at subject | 46 | 0.6% | |
Applied | 36 | 0.5% | |
Total | 107 | 1.4% | |
Police service dog | Presence only | 169 | 2.2% |
Track only | 178 | 2.3% | |
Bite | 425 | 5.6% | |
Total | 772 | 10.2% | |
Speciality munitions | 76 | 1.0% | |
Police firearm (excluding officer-involved shootings) | Drawn and displayed | 1,198 | 15.8% |
Pointed at subject | 2,117 | 27.9% | |
Total | 3,315 | 43.7% | |
"Other" intervention option (i.e., weapons of opportunity) | 50 | 0.7% | |
Total | 7,583 | 100.0% |
Appendix B
Officer response | Deployment type | Count | % |
---|---|---|---|
Physical control soft | Pressure points | 22 | 0.7% |
Joint locks | 54 | 1.8% | |
Escort/Come-along techniques | 114 | 3.8% | |
Takedown | 199 | 6.6% | |
Total | 389 | 12.8% | |
Physical control hard | Stuns/Strikes | 734 | 24.2% |
Carotid control/Vascular neck restraint (VNR) | 25 | 0.8% | |
Takedown | 285 | 9.4% | |
Total | 1,044 | 34.4% | |
Oleoresin capsicum spray | Applied | 253 | 8.3% |
Conducted energy weapon | Contact mode deployed | 113 | 3.7% |
Probe deployed | 617 | 20.3% | |
Total | 730 | 24.1% | |
Baton | Applied | 30 | 1.0% |
Extended range impact weapon | Applied | 36 | 1.2% |
Police service dog | Bite | 425 | 14.0% |
Speciality munitions | 76 | 2.5% | |
"Other" intervention option (i.e., weapons of opportunity) | 50 | 1.6% | |
Total | 3,033 | 100.0% |
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