External Engagement and Coordination: Parliament Hill Incident on October 22nd, 2014 - After Action Review

Issue

On October 24^th, 2014, at the request of the Commanding Officer of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police's (RCMP's) National Division, a review was initiated into the October 22^nd, 2014 incident on Parliament Hill. This review was led by National Division, under the direction of the Commanding Officer, with assistance from representatives in the RCMP's Internal Audit, Evaluation and Review Branch.

Objective

The objective of this after action review is to provide a factual account of key areas related to the response to this event and to make recommendations where gaps or unacceptable levels of risk are identified. It is also intended to provide lessons learned in order to facilitate continuous improvement regarding the provision of security services to Parliament Hill, and to the Prime Minister and visiting dignitaries and interoperability amongst the various agencies involved.

Scope

It should be noted that, while the initial Terms of Reference for this review identified a scope that included both internal and external elements, it was determined that due to the historical sensitivities associated with the complex jurisdictional operating environment on Parliament Hill, that the scope would be limited to an evaluation of external coordination and engagement of partners relative to this incident. The RCMP has asked the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) to conduct a separate review of the RCMP's actions during this incident, so as to ensure neutrality and objectivity relative to the review of the RCMP's actions.

This review will examine the RCMP's actions following the gunman's entry into the Centre Block on October 22^nd, 2014 through until the time Parliament Hill is reopened to the public on October 24^th, 2014. The review will be limited to the protective actions taken by the RCMP in response to the incident on the grounds of Parliament Hill, and will not include any investigative elements or the RCMP actions within the House of Commons, with the exception of the specific actions taken to secure the Prime Minister and the National Division's Emergency Response Team's interventions.

The review will seek to provide answers to the following lines of enquiry:

1. Operational Preparedness
   1. Was an appropriate scenario based plan in place for this type of incident? Was it effectively implemented?
   2. Were appropriate resources, including policing tools and personnel, available?
2. Decision Making
   1. Were roles and responsibilities clearly defined and fully fulfilled, including command and control responsibilities?
   2. Were decisions responsive to the evolving incident?
3. Operational Communications
   1. Was communication well managed and coordinated to facilitate response to the evolving incident?
   2. Were all RCMP units and external partner agencies fully and accurately informed on an on-going basis?
4. External Communications
   1. Was law enforcement communication with the public in general clear and accurate and did it appropriately convey the law enforcement actions and response?

This review will exclude anything pertaining to the RCMP's operational response (as supported by the decision to limit the initial scope), and the gathering and sharing of any pre-incident information regarding the suspect, nor does it include an examination of the resourcing levels of the partner agencies. Moreover, the review will focus on those areas within the purview of the National Division. National Division has a dual mandate: high-profile sensitive investigations and protective operations; however, for the purpose of this review, the focus will be limited to National Division's protective mandate. All efforts will be made to minimize the duplication between this review and any other internal or external review associated with this event.

Methodology

This review relies on evidence gathered through interviews, questionnaires and through examination of video and other recorded evidence. A focus group was held to gather information on October 31^st, 2014 and involved external partners, with some RCMP representation.

The validation of facts took place on an on-going basis throughout this study. A draft version of the report was made available to partners for validation prior to finalization. Partners were also asked to assess the validity of ensuing recommendations; however, the implementation of recommendations will remain the responsibility, where possible, of National Division and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The recommendations that are beyond the purview of National Division and/or the RCMP will be shared with the external stakeholders for their consideration.

Background

Parliament Hill is a symbol of Canadian democracy and a key element for ensuring the continuity of a constitutional government. The importance of ensuring the safety and security of Parliamentarians, visiting Internationally Protected Person's (IPP), personnel and the general public is paramount and it is essential that Parliament Hill is protected to a level that is commensurate with the evolving national and international threat environment. The provision of security services on Parliament Hill must strike a balance between public safety and public accessibility to the grounds of Parliament Hill. At this point in time, ensuring the safety of the people, buildings and grounds within the Parliamentary Precinct is a shared responsibility between the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the House of Commons Security Service (HCSS), Senate Protective Services (SPS) and Ottawa Police Services (OPS).

Overview of the Parliamentary Precinct: Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) defines the Parliamentary Precinct as the Crown owned buildings that are occupied by the House of Commons, the Senate and the Library of Parliament. The Parliamentary Precinct can be broken down into two zones: the Parliamentary Secure Zone and the Ancillary Zone. The following is an overview of the buildings that fall within these zones:

• Parliamentary Secure Zone
  • Centre Block, East Block and West Block
• Ancillary Zone
  • Rideau Committee Rooms (10 Committee rooms) at 1 Wellington Street;
  • Victoria Building (40 Senator's offices and 4 Committee rooms);
  • La Promenade (62 Members of Parliament, their staff and 3 Committee rooms);
  • Confederation Building (Government Ministers, Parliamentarians, and their staff);
  • Justice Building (85 Members of Parliament and their staff); and
  • Wellington Building (69 Members of Parliament and 10 Committee rooms).

Jurisdictional Overview of Security Services within the Parliamentary Precinct: Jurisdiction over security services within the Parliamentary Precinct is as follows: the House of Commons Security Services (HCSS) is responsible for the safety and security of the central and west sections of the Centre and West Blocks; the Senate Protective Services (SPS) are responsible for the east portion of the Centre Block and the East Block; and the RCMP maintains jurisdictional responsibility for securing the grounds of Parliament Hill and for the security of the Prime Minister and visiting dignitaries while outside of the building, as set out in paragraph 17 (1)(d) of the RCMP Regulations (1988). The RCMP, given their access to required infrastructure (NCRCC, Incident Command System, resources and established networks with other police stakeholders) are also called upon to assume operational lead in the event that any significant incident occurs *****^{Footnote 1} *****. As police of jurisdiction, Ottawa Police Services (OPS) are responsible for leading criminal investigations, excluding National Security investigations, within the Parliamentary Precinct and are responsible for the areas outside of the Parliamentary Precinct, including Wellington Street and the area of the National War Memorial. It should also be noted that both the House of Commons Security Service (HCSS) and Senate Protective Services (SPS) have also expanded their level of authority and responsibility to include parking enforcement within the Parliamentary Precinct.

Sequence of Events^{Footnote 2}

On Wednesday October 22^nd, 2014 at approximately 9:50 am a gunman shot and killed a member of the Canadian Forces Sentry at the National War Memorial, located at the intersection of Wellington Street and Elgin Street in Ottawa, Ontario. The gunman returned to his vehicle and proceeded to the Elgin Street gate of Parliament Hill, where he abandons his vehicle and enters the grounds of Parliament Hill by foot at 09:52:31. Twenty three seconds later, at 09:52:54, the suspect commandeers the vehicle of a Member of Parliament (MP) that is parked outside of the East Block. At 09:52:58, the RCMP member posted at the East Block, after being alerted by a female pedestrian, radios in that there is a gunman on Parliament Hill. At approximately 09:53:45 the gunman enters the Centre Block of the Parliament Buildings, through the front entrance, where gunfire ensues and the suspect is fatally wounded. The grounds of Parliament Hill are closed to the public during and immediately following this event and remain closed to the public until the evening of October 24^th, 2014. At 9:55 the Officer in Charge of Criminal and Protective Operations (CROPS), National Division, RCMP is advised of an unfolding incident on Parliament Hill, the Officer in Charge of GDPP is contacted and CROPS is advised that the National Division Emergency Response Team has been deployed to Parliament Hill. At 10:00, CROPS provides the Commissioner with a verbal briefing over the phone. At 10:02 CROPS provides a verbal briefing over the phone to the Commanding Officer of the National Division and the NCRCC is activated *****, in response to the unfolding incident on Parliament Hill, with the identification of an Incident Commander and Deputy Incident Commander occurring at 10:03. At 10:20 a message is sent out to internal/external partners (see Appendix A for the distribution list) advising that the NCRCC has been urgently activated due to the unfolding incidents on Parliament Hill and requesting that they report back and send a representative to the NCRCC. An additional email is sent at 10:20 to National Division's Officers advising of NCRCC activation.

The following timeline depicts the initial engagement of internal and external partners within the NCRCC:

• 10:02 NCRCC Activated, ***** (October 22^nd, 2014)
• 10:12 General Duty Protective Policing (GDPP)
• 10:15 CIU/PIU, Incident Director, NCRCC, Radio Tech, Training, OCC and OPS
• 10:20 Sûreté du Quebec, Incident Commander
• 10:25 National Division Communications, Geospatial, Deputy Incident Commander
• 10:30 CBRNE, CRNSS, NVSIS, Scribe
• 10:45 Senate Protective Services, Traffic (Off Site Director)
• 10:48 CSIS
• 10:50 Air Services Ottawa
• 11:00 Central Help Desk, Event Management System, Occupational Health and Safety, PMPD, INSET, TIS/HASP
• 11:02 Ottawa Paramedic Services
• 11:11 VIPPD
• 11:15 City Traffic Management, EMRT
• 11:30 SRR
• 11:32 Negotiator
• 11:33 CROPS
• 11:36 IT Services
• 11:43 Gatineau Police
• 11:45 House of Commons Security Force, NOC, HQ Protective, RIC
• 11:46 OPP
• 11:55 DND
• 12:03 NCR Tact Troop
• 12:15 CNT RCMP
• 12:30 OC Transpo
• 12:55 City of Ottawa
• 13:30 Ottawa Fire Services
• 14:00 PROS
• 14:17 DSB
• 14:29 PHSU
• 15:00 DLU
• 15:45 NSS
• 16:00 Government Operations Centre
• 17:10 NCRCC Deactivation (October 23rd, 2014)

The following table represents a chronology of key actions undertaken in response to the Parliament Hill incident of October 22^nd, 2014 and provides an overview of information that was shared:

Line of Enquiry #1: Operational Preparedness

According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Operational Preparedness is defined as the continuous cycle of planning, organizing, training, equipping, exercising, evaluating and taking corrective actions to ensure effective coordination during an incident response.^{Footnote 4} The RCMP's Operational Planning Unit and National Capital Region Command Centre is a multi-disciplinary unit that is mandated to provide support to all Protective Operations in the National Capital Region (NCR). They are responsible for the National Capital Region Command Centre (NCRCC), Protective Operations, Operational Planning/Coordination of Major Events, Visits and Demonstrations in the NCR, Protective Operations Information System (POIS), Geo- Spatial and Mobile Command Post (MCP).

The Operational Planning/Coordination Unit serves as a point of contact for various internal and external partners, and is responsible for the overall coordination and administration of planning meetings, as well as for the development of integrated operational plans in relation to major events, visits and demonstrations within the National Capital Region.

This continuous cycle of planning is purposed to ensure the following:

• Appropriate operational plans are in place and valid;
• Resources capabilities are clearly defined and commensurate to the threat environment;
• Human, financial and capital resources are available to operationalize and sustain the necessary response to a critical incident; and
• Interoperability and integration amongst the various responders.

Line of Enquiry #2: Decision-making

The ability to make timely and effective decisions during a critical incident is fundamental to the success of an operational response and to the resolution of an incident. In reviewing the decision-making process and governance structures surrounding the October 22^nd, 2014 Parliament Hill incident, the focus was on whether or not all personnel involved in the emergency response to this critical incident had a thorough and consistent understanding of decision-making standards, that these existing standards were adhered to and in support of ensuring operational responses were timely, and that the varying Incident Management/Command approaches were cohesive and integrated. Several issues arose with respect to the decision-making process and the following provides an overview of the issues, recommendations as well as best practices surrounding this line of enquiry.

Line of Enquiry #3: Operational Communications

For the purpose of this review, operational communications will be defined as all communications amongst responders in support of an operational purpose. Inefficient and ineffective operational communications during a critical incident will not only result in a breakdown in operational responses, but create undue frustration and confusion amongst stakeholders, negatively impact the reputation of all organizations involved, and increase the length of time for complete resolution of a critical incident. While several of the operational communication challenges that arose throughout this review can be directly attributed to the complexity of the jurisdictional environment within the Parliamentary Precinct, the following is an overview of the specific issues and recommendations associated with operational communications throughout the October 22^nd, 2014 incident on Parliament Hill.

Line of Enquiry #4: External Communications

The significance of communication should never be understated. Organizations are reliant on internal and external communication as a means of exchanging ideas, message or information/intelligence. In the absence of communication, the ability of an organization to function is inhibited. During a crisis situation, the importance of communication increases exponentially. While the previous section focused on Operational Communications, this section is intended to explore the issue of external communications during the incident of October 22^nd, 2014. The issue of external communication was examined through the following lenses: coordination of communications with various internal and external stakeholders, external communications throughout the incident, and internal crisis communications. In addition to the identification of external communication gaps, a series of best practices were also identified. The following is an overview of the issues, recommendations and best practices associated with external communications during the October 22^nd, 2014 Parliament Hill incident.

Conclusion

The tragic events that occurred in Ottawa on October 22^nd, 2014 have undoubtedly altered the Canadian landscape. While the objective of this review is to provide a factual account of key areas related to the external response and coordination of stakeholders surrounding this event while making recommendations for improvement where gaps or unacceptable levels of risk were identified, the efforts and engagement of all internal and external partners/stakeholders should not go unnoticed. When faced with a crisis situation, these organizations worked together to ensure the timely and safe resolution of this critical incident and were courageous in their operational responses, all with a goal of restoring public safety. Moving forward, National Division remains committed to addressing the recommendations outlined within this review. These lessons learned and best practices will further foster National Division's commitment to continuous improvement while fulfilling its mandate and commitment to delivering world-class protective operations.

List of Recommendations and Follow-up

• Recommendation #1: *****
• Recommendation #2: *****
• Recommendation #3A: *****
• Recommendation #3B: *****
• Recommendation #4: *****
• Recommendation #5A: *****
• Recommendation #5B: *****
• Recommendation #5C: *****
• Recommendation #6: *****
• Recommendation #7: *****
• Recommendation #8: *****
• Recommendation #9: *****
• Recommendation #10A: *****
• Recommendation #10B: *****
• Recommendation #11A: *****
• Recommendation #11B: *****
• Recommendation #12: *****
• Recommendation #13A: *****
• Recommendation #13B: *****
• Recommendation #14: *****
• Recommendation #15: *****
• Recommendation #16: *****
• Recommendation #17: *****
• Recommendation #18: *****
• Recommendation #19A: *****
• Recommendation #19B: *****
• Recommendation #19C: *****
• Recommendation #20: *****
• Recommendation #21: *****
• Recommendation #22A: *****
• Recommendation #22B: *****
• Recommendation #23: *****
• Recommendation #24: *****